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The Adornian reception of (the) child(hood) in Helmut Lachenmann’s Ein Kinderspiel 
 
§1 Method and introduction 
 
Contemporary work comments show that many contemporary composers apparently feel a 
need to legitimize their works, a process of self-reflection in which Adorno’s philosophy is 
both influential and controversial. Studies on the contemporary influence of Adorno’s notion 
of musical material, however, often tend towards unilateral projections of Adorno’s ideas on 
the present or reflections based on typologies. In contrast, a study aiming at a critical 
reflection on contemporary philosophical assumptions on the basis of the analysis and 
comparison of specific compositions, appears to be more fruitful. In an attempt to grasp the 
relation between philosophical constellations and analytical techniques, aesthetic assumptions 
are necessarily posited, while the actual relation between idea and technique still needs to be 
discovered by means of the analysis of musical artworks. 
 
In the late sixties, Helmut Lachenmann (1935) - who would always remain conscious of the 
(remnants of) his own musical and philosophical heritage - developed a new musical material, 
conceptualized by the composer as “musique concrète instrumentale”,1 and expressed in, 
among others, his notorious composition Pression for cello (1969). 1969 is also the year of 
death of Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, a philosopher, sociologist and musicologist whose 
influence on the ideas and work of Lachenmann is difficult to overestimate. Like many 
composers after the Second World War, Lachenmann was well aware of the social 
responsibility of the artist. Yet, unlike the rather palpable social and political commitment of 
Luigi Nono, who incorporated in Il canto sospeso (1955-56) letters of persons sentenced to 
death, Lachenmann was on his guard for imposing his own ideology on music and obtaining 
“authority” which does not arise “from the specific law of composition, its own logic and 
immanent correctness, but from the gesture from which the work turns itself to the listener”2 
(Adorno). “For the composer, there is no way to compromise”3, Lachenmann explains. 
Consequently, Lachenmann does not require the authority of his compositions as already 
acquired, but tries to uncover and follow the inherent tendency of the musical material itself, a 
process which would evolve to something necessarily historical and dialectical.  
 
Indeed, once “the public” had, in a way, “digested” and become “used to” the particular 
soundscape of Lachenmann’s musique concrète instrumentale, as it was expressed in 
compositions like Notturno for cello and orchestra (1966-68), temA for flute, voice and cello 
(1968), Air for percussion and grand orchestra (1968-69), Pression (1969) for cello, 
Kontrakadenz for orchestra (1970-71), Gran Torso for string quartet (1971-72) and Guero 
(1980) for grand piano, Lachenmann realized the danger that his works would be perceived as 
some strange “effect” or curiosity, or worse, absorbed into a “stupid-disagreeable 
equanimity”4 (Adorno).5 For this reason, Lachenmann rather considered the material and 
                                                          
1 “The concept refers to a music in which the sound events are thus chosen and organized, that the musical event 
does no less involve the manner of their production as the resultant acoustic qualities themselves. Tone, volume, 
etc. do not sound for their own sake, but mark or indicate the specific situation: one hears the energy and 
resistance against which a sound arises. One such aspect however, does not exist of itself: it must be exposed 
and supported by a compositional technique […]. The whole becomes an aesthetic provocation: beauty as 
deprived habit.” (H. LACHENMANN, as quoted by H.-P. JAHN, Presssion. Einige Bemerkungen zur Komposition 
Helmut Lachenmanns und zu den interpretationstechnischen Bedingungen, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. 
METZGER and R. RIEHN, München, 1988, 58).  
2 T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 183. 
3 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 358. 
4 T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 148. 
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composition techniques in the above-mentioned compositions as a model, which needed to be 
refined in later works, and lifted to a higher - or better: another - level.6  
 
In later works, Lachenmann would not only develop his composition techniques 
(“Verfahrensweisen”), but also “relinquish” his self-developed musical material (“Rohstoff”). 
In this context, one may refer to one of Lachenmann’s work comments on Mouvement (-vor 
der Erstarrung) for ensemble (1984), a composition in which pitches arise (again):  
 
“I sometimes read analyses such as Mouvement (-vor der Erstarrung) - originated in 
1984 - in which the author is surprised about the presence of strongly organized 
pitches, which seems at odds with the idea of a “Musique concrète instrumentale”. The 
drawer does not fit properly. Those are just the small inevitable accidents that happen 
when one forgets that creativity - although it never forgets - does not know stagnation.”7 
 
Lachenmann thus seems particularly apprehensive about a blind surrender to the material - 
and  social ideology - and tries to back out of it by means of creativity and critical sense. As a 
consequence, “old categories of sensation”, such as melody, rhythm, consonance and pathos, 
reappear in the margin of his compositions.8 At this point, the composer faces the Adornian 
riddle of the sphinx,9 leading to the notorious question: how is it possible to create integrated 
and autonomous works of art out of reified and disintegrated material? Apparently, 
Lachenmann knows the answer:  
 
“[A]t the edges of this compositional approach [the “musique concrète instrumentale”] 
there appeared such previously excluded, old - though in this context rejuvenated - 
categories of sensation as rhythm, consonance, melody, pathos, which must be uprooted 
from their bourgeois commodification and invoked in all their “dangerousness”.”10 
 
Hence this phenomenon, which was once called by Adorno the “coming of age” or 
“Mündigkeit” of new music, is considered by Lachenmann as a possible escape out of 
commodification or reification. For this reason, it was not Lachenmann’s intention to hide the 
sediment spirit of the “all too familiar” - as in some kind of “Phantasmagoria” - but on the 
contrary, to stress its artificial nature by grabbing and exploring the material as in a children’s 
play.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 During a lecture at the Orpheus Institute in Ghent, Lachenmann also realized “that the procedural 
stringency must go beyond the immediate experience of “palpability”, however it may have been 
developed, if it is not to lose its way in the botanical or the playful” (H. LACHENMANN, Philosophy of 
composition. Is there such a thing?, in Identity and difference: essays on music, language and time, ed. J. CROSS, 
J. HARVEY, H. LACHENMANN, A. WELLMER and R. KLEIN, Leuven, 2004, 65). See also M. KALTENECKER, 
Lachenmann und Gustav Mahler, in Nachgedachte Musik. Studien zum Werk von Helmut Lachenmann, ed. J. 
HIEKEL and S. MAUSER, Saarbrücken, 2005, 54: “A work can stick at such effects […] and it is in danger of 
being perceived only as an overall effect (so that only the crunching sounds  in Pression are commented […])”.  
6 LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 381. 
7 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 212. 
8 H. LACHENMANN, Philosophy of composition. Is there such a thing?, in Identity and difference: essays on 
music, language and time, ed. J. CROSS, J. HARVEY, H. LACHENMANN, A. WELLMER and R. KLEIN, Leuven, 
2004, 65. 
9 “Works of art try to solve the riddles, given up by the world, to devour the people. The world is the sphinx, the 
artist its blinded Oedipus and the artworks of this kind his wise answer, that plunges the sphinx into the abyss” 
(T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 125). 
10 H. LACHENMANN, Philosophy of composition. Is there such a thing?, in Identity and difference: essays on 
music, language and time, ed. J. CROSS, J. HARVEY, H. LACHENMANN, A. WELLMER and R. KLEIN, Leuven, 
2004, 65. 
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It is in this context, that Lachenmann’s piano cycle Ein Kinderspiel (1980) may be situated:  
 
“I inevitably grab the occupied material, point out its occupation, experience this 
“charge” as negative wealth and sometimes even reinforce this familiar aspect”.11  
 
Consequently, Lachenmann does not intent to follow the inherent tendency of the musical 
material and to destroy taboos out of some ideal of “imitation of natural beauty” (Adorno), 
but rather to intervene in the familiar through deconstruction of the literary, to “overcome its 
‘tabooization’ and false sense of protection and security”.12  
 
The material of Ein Kinderspiel consists of familiar shapes and models, “such as children’s 
songs, dance forms and the easiest grip-technical models”,13 considered by Lachenmann as 
objective data, upon which his own subjective “experiences of structural thinking”14 are 
projected. The transparent structure of the familiar is indeed shifted to the background, to 
allow for an “else” to develop, something present in the structure, which, at the same time, 
arises from it: “the aura of sounds”.15  
 
Thus, the familiar material “resounds” both literally and metaphysically, presenting a “non-
identity” (Derrida) out of the resonance of the familiar, “a familiar else, which questions the 
certainty of the concept”.16 As a result, Lachenmann reminds us of certain forces within the 
reified material, that “withdraw from the dialectic to which they comply”,17 in a way 
comparable to Webern’s interpretation of the row as a constructivist notion, that allows for a 
purification of the individual tones, ultimately creating form, leading to the only possible 
notification that “its exterior is not its exterior” (Derrida).18  
 
 
§2 Analysis 
 
Ein Kinderspiel is dedicated to David, the adult child of the composer. The score opens with a 
quote of Adorno: “…in which it concerns more the demonstration of a child’s model than the 
charming of childhood…”. A “false projection” of an (adult) ideology on the world of the 
child - such as an education principle or a nostalgic image of childhood19 - is indeed not the 
idea, but a “real mimesis” of the phenomenon “being a child”, “to experience lustfully and, in 
this experience, discover the world, nature, technology, art and especially itself, thus develop 
                                                          
11 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 196 and H. 
LACHENMANN and H.-K. METZGER, Fragen-Antworten, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. METZGER and R. 
RIEHN, München, 1988, 123. 
12 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 165. 
13 Ibid., 393. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 239. 
16 M. SCHERZINGER, Dekonstruktives Denken in der Musik Lachenmanns, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. 
METZGER and R. RIEHN, München, 1988, 98. 
17 T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 125. 
18 J. DERRIDA, Randgänge der Philosophie, Vienna, 1999, 18. 
19 “Kinderspiel [is] no educational music and is not necessarily for children” (H. LACHENMANN, Musik als 
existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 393). See also M. SCHMIDT, Vergessenheit. Zu 
Helmut Lachenmanns Ästhetik der Kindheit, in Nachgedachte Musik. Studien zum Werk von Helmut 
Lachenmann, ed. J. HIEKEL and S. MAUSER, Saarbrücken, 2005, 105-107 and 114-115. 
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and unfold its powers ever more”.20 However, if “being a child” is to be more than a mere 
satisfaction of curiosity about sensory stimuli, “adaptation and discipline”21 are inevitably 
part of the development process.  
 
By these words, Lachenmann broaches the same paradox as Adorno has formulated in 
Minima Moralia, under the paragraph “Hänschen klein”. This title, which refers to a famous 
German children’s song, is also the name of the first piece of Lachenmann’s piano cycle Ein 
Kinderspiel. Adorno described the paradox as follows:  
 
“The intellectual is faced with the choice, to inform himself or to turn his back to the 
hateful. When he chooses for the first, he causes harm to himself, thinks against his own 
impulses and on top of it, is in danger to become as mean as the thing to which he 
concedes, for economy does not tolerate pleasure, and if one only wants to understand 
it, one needs to “think economically”. If, however, he does not take part in it, he 
actually hypostatizes his own, by economic reality and abstract exchange ratio 
cultivated, mind as something absolute, while he could only reach the Spirit [“die 
Geist”] in the contemplation of his own conditionality. […] He drastically experiences, 
as existential question, the contemptuous alternatives, in front of which late capitalism 
secretly puts all its members: to become an adult as well, or to remain a child.”22  
 
Thus the listener faces the choice (i) to remain a child and listen to music with an open mind 
or (ii) to grow up and study the music. In the first case, he is in danger of being unable to 
relinquish the music and to concede blindly to social ideology by “sensuous listening”23; in 
the second case he risks to adopt certain biases or taboos which blind him for the utopian 
possibility that reality may be different. However, the listener does not need to stay and linger 
within this antinomy. Indeed, Adorno’s idea of negative dialectic implies that the 
configuration of the idea emerges from the extremes, “as the totality which is characterized 
by the possibility of a meaningful existence of such opposites together”.24  
 
Similarly, in Ein Kinderspiel, Lachenmann aims at  
 
“the experience of musical expression, not only as irrationally perceived mind-appeal of 
our cortical area, but expression, on the one hand, as a result of new issued rules, but 
on the other also as a result of the overcoming of already settled rules. In this sense, my 
pieces Ein Kinderspiel intent to be models which are easy to grab and to grasp.”25 
 
                                                          
20 Lachenmann continues: “In which it is, of course, no secret, that probably no child is spared from the human 
experience as “abyss”, that children even come across more abysses, than is known and desired by their 
educators” (H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 162).  
21 Ibid., 162. See also ibid., 163: “Therefore I have nothing against music education which is based on 
traditional heritage. The associated discipline and adaptation is only fatal, when it is not a means for mental 
development, but a final goal, which also concerns reinforcement and tabooization instead of understanding and 
pervasive discovery”.  
22 T. ADORNO, Minima moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben, in Gesammelte Schriften, IV, ed. R. 
TIEDEMANN e.a., Frankfurt am Main, 1980, 150-151. See also N. LUHMANN, as quoted by E. HÜPPE, 
Topographie der ästhetischen Neugierde. Versuch über Helmut Lachenmann, in Nachgedachte Musik. Studien 
zum Werk von Helmut Lachenmann, ed. J. HIEKEL and S. MAUSER, Saarbrücken, 2005, 95: “The more the 
conditions of understanding are understood, the less there is possible”. 
23 T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 123. 
24 W. BENJAMIN, as quoted by Adorno in T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 
13. 
25 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 163. 
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Note the analogy with Kant’s transcendental aesthetic, according to which aesthetic 
judgments only occur “in a free play of imagination and understanding”26. One may also refer 
to Nietzsche’s metaphor of the child, that says “yes” to the world and, out of the wreckage of 
the familiar, “re-creates” its own morality. The latter image is especially relevant, since it 
inspired Adorno for his interpretation and description of the compositions Renard (1916) and 
l’Histoire du soldat (1918) of Igor Stravinsky as a specific kind of objectivism, that is 
“Infantilismus” (Philosophie der neuen Musik). The “truth” of those compositions, which, in 
Adorno’s opinion, consists in the fact that their artificial nature is not concealed but 
emphasized - while the various musical entities and functions are loosened and put back into 
various capacities27 - is indeed very comparable to Lachenmann’s aim to unveil and clarify 
the musical structure.  
 
Thus, the structure of Hänschen klein, the first piece of Ein Kinderspiel, is very simple.28 The 
listener hears a sequence of descending chromatic tones, in which the eighty-eight keys of the 
keyboard are “explored”29 in a mechanical way, at a pace which feels “too slow”30 and in a 
rhythm that, at least until the first half of bar 24, seems entirely based on the nursery rhyme 
Hänschen klein. (This children’s song has the form of a small three-part song (ABA’), of 
which the A-part is composed of a periodic structure of 2x4 bars. After a contrasting middle 
part of four bars, the consequent of the A-part is resumed. Thus the song consists of 16 bars. 
Subsequently, bars 17-24 of Lachenmann’s Hänschen klein may be considered as a varied 
repetition of bars 9-16 of BA’ of the children’s song, followed by a coda of 7 bars. I will 
return to this point in due course.) Furthermore, the descending chromatic scales are decorated 
with appogiaturas, picked from a whole-tone scale, and two triads: a major sixth chord in bar 
9 and a minor six-four chord in bars 29-31 - or two vertical inversions of a minor third and a 
quarter. Finally, the descending chromatics in bars 17-28 are accompanied by a second 
chromatic layer, which is put a major third higher than the first one. Thus, the pitch structure 
of the entire piece can be traced back to all possible intervals within the range of a quarter - as 
they appear together in the cluster in bars 13-18 - with the exception of the mute clusters in 
bars 5-8 and 19,4-22. 
 
In literature, the piece has been perceived as a childish riddle, which tempts the listener to 
deduce the correct song from the rhythm. In this respect, Scherzinger has attempted, with the 
help of Rehding, to give an explanation to those passages of Lachenmanns Hänschen klein, in 
which the rhythm differs from the children’s song. “Hans”, Scherzinger explains, 
“hallucinatory wanders to ‘Alle meine Entchen’ (from bar 23 onwards)”, after which, from 
bar 25, he apparently still meets someone else: “Hans and his ducks, one could say, suddenly 
meet ‘Fuchs, du hast die Gans gestohlen’”.31 Authors like Schmidt, on the other hand, rather 
consider the piece as an attempt to objectify the children’s song and to displace it by means of 
                                                          
26 I. KANT, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Leipzig, 1922, 56.  
27 See on this subject L. VAN EECKE, Adorno’s Listening to Strawinsky - Towards a Deconstruction of 
Objectivism, IRASM 45, 2, 243-260. 
28 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 164. 
29 “What is going on in the seven pieces of my Kinderspiel, is “nothing more” than mechanically explored states 
of a similarly understood pause on a more or less simple stereotypical gesture” (H. LACHENMANN, Musik als 
existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 201 and H. LACHENMANN and H.-K. METZGER, 
Fragen-Antworten, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. METZGER and R. RIEHN, München, 1988, 129). See on 
Lachenmann’s notion of “abtasten” also E. HÜPPE, Topographie der ästhetischen Neugierde. Versuch über 
Helmut Lachenmann, in Nachgedachte Musik. Studien zum Werk von Helmut Lachenmann, ed. J. HIEKEL and S. 
MAUSER, Saarbrücken, 2005,  96-97.  
30 M. SCHERZINGER, Dekonstruktives Denken in der Musik Lachenmanns, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. 
METZGER and R. RIEHN, München, 1988, 108. 
31 Ibid., 110. 
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small interferences: “Hänschen klein explores the world in the “almost reckless” movement of 
the famous children’s song: its rhythm is recognizable, but not its melody. The interval 
sequence of the song has to be reconstructed by the listening perception, although it does not 
appear in fact.”32 Apparently, the famous Habanera of the French opera Carmen of Bizet is 
not such a “hit”, that it is immediately recognized by German authors… Nonetheless, the 
descending chromatic scales, the rhythm, the appogiaturas - so short that the differences in 
pitch with the ‘original’ can hardly be recognized - the accompanying triads and the 
‘Viertaktichkeit’ sound suspiciously familiar. In addition, each verse of Habanera comprises 
twenty-four bars, which may explain why the rhythmic paraphrase of the children’s song in 
Lachenmann’s Hänschen klein does not last sixteen, but twenty-four bars. In Habanera, the 
choir takes over the melody after sixteen bars, accompanied by four intervals: two minor 
thirds, an octave and a quarter. Likewise, the mute chords which accompany Lachenmann’s 
Hänschen klein, exclusively consist of those intervals (although the octaves resound with all 
of their “chromatic nuances”). 
 
Hence Lachenmann composed his Hänschen klein out of the remnants of the familiar, which 
is especially clear in the beginning of the piece. The expectations of the listener are, however, 
taken for a ride, by (i) a flawless continuation of the descending chromatic scale, (ii) 
unexpected appogiaturas (e.g. in bars 6 and 8), (iii) a variation of rhythm and timbre in bars 9-
12,…  
 
Gradually, Habanera fades away, not only to allow for a rhythmic paraphrase of Hänschen 
klein, but also to develop something present in the composition: “the aura of sounds”33:  
- bars 1-5: pedal with high pitches 
- bars 5-8: low mute cluster with high pitches 
- bars 9-12: tenuto 
- bars 13-18: mute cluster above the played keys 
- bar 19, 1-3: secco (“Extrem im Minimum”) 
- bars 19,4-22: mute cluster beneath the played keys 
- bars 23-29: pedal with low pitches (“Extrem im Maximum”)34 
 
As a consequence, the rhythmic modifications and development of sounds bring about another 
perception of the famous melody in the coda, which may explain why Lachenmann did not 
finish the piece with “grosse Hans”, but “neue Hänschen”35…  
 
In the second piece Wolken im eisigen Mondlicht, the ambit of the right hand is limited to an 
“in five-finger-range staying f-major/minor-scale”.36 Although the independent directions of 
the fingers and the metric shifts may, at first sight, refer to a simple finger exercise, the 
chromatic shifts, parallel harmonic progressions, differences of colour, accompaniment of 
open octaves, use of the pedal and lack of a traditional cadence clearly recalls Trübe Wolken 
(1881) of Franz Liszt.  
 
                                                          
32 M. SCHMIDT, Vergessenheit. Zu Helmut Lachenmanns Ästhetik der Kindheit, in Nachgedachte Musik. Studien 
zum Werk von Helmut Lachenmann, ed. J. HIEKEL and S. MAUSER, Saarbrücken, 2005, 110. 
33 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 239. 
34 Ibid., 164. 
35 M. SCHERZINGER, Dekonstruktives Denken in der Musik Lachenmanns, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. 
METZGER and R. RIEHN, München, 1988, 111. 
36 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 164. 
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In Akiko, Falscher Chinese and Filterschaukel, the right hand mainly plays the white keys, the 
left hand the black keys of the piano. As such, in Akiko there is a polyphony of “some kind of 
phrygian melody”37, tenuto and a pentatonic scale, secco. The tenuto melody is always played 
on the beat, the secco melody initially off the beat, to interfere in the resonance of the tenuto 
melody. At the end of the fourth grand stave, an unexpected 3/16 rest appears, as if one beat 
has been skipped. As a result, the secco melody is noted on the beat, at least in the score, for it 
appears to be a mere visual peculiarity. Since the secco melody is missing as a reference, the 
metric rules seem to have blurred. This little metric play may recall a deconstruction of jazz 
music and Adorno’s ideas thereof, such as his remark that “[i]mprovisations [in jazz music] 
are confined within the walls of the harmonic and metric scene”.38 By contrast, the sounds in 
Akiko rather seem to “withdraw from the dialectic, to which they comply”.39   
 
An experiment with jazz rhythm also appears in Falscher Chinese. While the tempo is 
dictated by the right hand, the left hand wanders along - “a little drunk” - the homorhythmic 
chords in the right hand, sometimes on, sometimes off the beaten track. Once again, this 
childish concept and its simple objective structure may point to subjective elements beyond 
the score. As such, by means of the “sound-aspects” tenuto, accentuation and pedal, the 
dichotomy between marsh- and jazz-music increasingly evolves into chimes, sounding very 
clearly in bars 25-26 and from bar 30 to the end. In this respect, the piece is already referring 
to the sixth piece of the cycle, Glockenturm.  
 
In Filterschaukel, colours are ‘filtered’ from a static element. During a short prelude, a ten 
tone cluster is struck eight times, to fade twenty-four times into chords, sounding more or less 
familiar, but “perceived as new into the filter-light”.40 Subsequently, there is a short transition 
(until the end of p. 15) and a second part (from p. 16), in which the ‘filtered’ chords of the 
first part re-sound in augmentation (twice as long), in another register and according to 
another playing technique. The ‘filtered’ chords, which evolved entirely from the key attacks 
in the first part, are now picked from the resonances of the attacks. In the coda, the ten tone 
cluster of the first part is ‘filtered’ once again in the register and according to the procedure of 
the second part, after which the fingers release one by one (and the last finger still hits one 
single tone above a mute octave). If the sonority of the piece is reminiscent of an organ or a 
harmonium41, its homophony and static character refers to a prelude. As such, the piece may 
recall the first prelude of Das Wohltemperierte Klavier (WTC) of J.S. Bach, an entirely 
homophonic piece in which broken chords are ‘filtered’ in the light of the first tones of each 
chord, kept sustained until the next. In this respect, the coda in Filterschaukel - in which the 
penultimate mute chord is, in a certain way, broken by the releasing fingers and the last finger 
hits one single tone above a mute octave - may be interpreted as a subtle reference to the last 
three bars of the first prelude of the WTC.  
 
Then again, the sixth piece Glockenturm shows a clear affinity with La Vallée des Cloches42, 
the fifth piece of the piano cycle Miroirs (1904-05) of Maurice Ravel. Both pieces are 
composed in different layers, which are also visually represented in the score by means of 
three staves. Furthermore, the pitch structure of both works is entirely based on some ‘chime’-
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 T. ADORNO, On Popular Music, in Essays on Music, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002, 445. 
39 T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 125. 
40 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 165. 
41 M. KALTENECKER, Avec Helmut Lachenmann, Paris, 2001, 213. 
42 See also L. JHANG, Maurice Ravel’s “Miroirs”: an analytical study of harmony and tonal structure, Texas, 
1994, 88-103. 
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motives, the rhythm of which is thus composed, that every sense of meter is missing. Ravel 
reaches this result by (i) handling the chime-motives with great rhythmic and metric freedom 
(e.g. the interaction between the a- and b-motives in bars 4-5) and (ii) noting the instruction 
“very softly and without accentuation” under the figuration of the ‘resonating wind chimes’ 
(bar 3). Lachenmann, too, makes use of rhythmic and metric shifts, which appear e.g. in the 
syncope and metric modifications in bars 3-4 and the metric shifts in bars 24-26 (which may 
be compared to bars 14-16 in Akiko). In addition, Lachenmann avoids every metric sense by 
composing with absolute time values, such as the alternation of eighth notes and half rests in 
the middle layer (compare with the Mode de valeurs et d’intensités (1949) of Olivier 
Messiaen).  
 
Unlike Ravel, however, who only composes with the sonority of well-tuned and brilliantly 
resonant chimes, Lachenmann (also) integrates ‘untuned’, ‘false’ and ‘dull’ sounds in 
Glockenturm. The layered structure of the piece could then be described as follows:  
- The top layer is built of dyads, picked from a specifically designed interval structure: the 
lower the chord, the bigger the interval and vice versa. The resulting sonority is one of chimes 
without (properly) tuned overtones.  
- The middle layer consists of dissonant mixtures of descending parallel quarts, which are 
composed of major thirds and minor seconds. The alternating inversions of those intervals 
imitate the differential effect of chimes. 
- The lowest layer is mainly constructed out of semitone clusters, gradually evolving into 
whole tone clusters. In this layer, a new playing technique is developed, producing a dull 
sonority, which is reminiscent of a chime being shortly attacked and muted again.  
 
As Glockenturm interferes in the familiar by a deconstruction of the literary, in this case 
Ravel’s La Vallée des Cloches, to “overcome its ‘tabooization’ and false sense of protection 
and security”43 and to allow for unheard, ‘untuned’, ‘false’ and ‘dull’ sounds, Schattentanz, 
the seventh and last piece of Ein Kinderspiel, is based on a well-known rhythmical pattern, to 
allow for a subjective emancipation of something new, hidden within the familiar. 
Lachenmann comments on this piece as follows:  
 
“In the seventh piece, yet another reverberation phenomenon of the quasi pedaled 
keyboard-corpus is developed, which is only uncovered and can only be experienced, as 
the tone material is limited to the topmost small second interval of the instrument and 
on this almost dematerialized sound, a gigue-like rhythm in the form of a rondo is 
performed and modified.”44 
 
In a more detailed analysis of this piece, Scherzinger45 notices a sudden transformation of the 
music, “from a self-present sound (as gigue, as pitch-cluster) to a completely strange 
soundscape (as march, as ghostly cry)”.46 The prominence of the rhythm may indeed evoke 
certain associations with the plastic, perceivable outer world, in the Wagnerian sense of the 
word.47 Thus, the ostinato and percussive beats of the two rightmost hammers of the piano 
                                                          
43 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 165. 
44 Ibid. 
45 M. SCHERZINGER, Dekonstruktives Denken in der Musik Lachenmanns, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. 
METZGER and R. RIEHN, München, 1988, 111-114. 
46 Ibid., 114. 
47 “By the rhythmic arrangement of tones, the musician comes into contact with the perceivable, plastic world, in 
virtue of the similarity of the laws, by which the movement of the visible objects of our perception is known by 
reason…” (R. WAGNER, as quoted by A. SEIDL, Vom Musikalisch-Erhabenen. Ein Beitrag zur Ästhetik der 
Tonkunst, Leipzig, 1907, 148). 
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may easily be associated with the movements of a dancer, evoking resonances, such as the 
ringing of bells. In this respect, Lachenmann comments on this piece as follows: “At least, of 
this piece one could say, what Ravel uttered on his Bolero: “Unfortunately, it does not 
contain music”.”48 In a way comparable to the repetition of the Bolero theme with orchestral 
variations, the Schattentanz theme is repeated - except for a few rhythmic variations - with 
differences in dynamics and resonance. Consequently, the perception of music as a linear time 
art disappears, to allow for a more static sense of “Nichtmusik”.49 
 
Lachenmann continues: “All seven pieces, however, concern this specific moment, the 
experience of music outside the ingrained concept of music.”50 In this reflection, Lachenmann 
seems to hedge against the obvious Adornian analysis, that Schattentanz is characterized by a 
distinct “flavour” and “specialty”, since “only that element is admitted, which marks the 
articulation and the instrumental colour [in this case, the resonance]”51, or worse, that music 
is robbed of its idiosyncrasy by the fetishization of rhythm and the regression of composing 
and degraded into a “parasite of painting”52. Even so, the sounds of Schattentanz may also 
“withdraw from the dialectic, to which they comply”53, to uncover the very essence of music 
from the objective brokenness of the composition, as it e.g. resounds at the end, as “another 
reverberation phenomenon of the quasi pedaled keyboard-corpus”54, in which, in the words 
of Wagner,  
 
“the music pronounces the essence of the gestures with such immediate clarity, that, 
once we are completely soaked in it, once our sight is completely blinded for the 
intensive perception of the gestures, we finally understand them, without seeing them.”55 
 
 
§3 In conclusion  
 
Bearing in mind the immanent methodology as described in the beginning of this article, it 
was my intention to explore the aesthetic ideas and assumptions as posited by the composer 
by means of a rather practical and score-based analysis of Lachenmann’s piano cycle Ein 
Kinderspiel. In this respect, the positive formulation of a final conclusion appears to be rather 
delicate, if not impossible. However, the analysis of Ein Kinderspiel certainly did point out 
that Lachenmann, inspired by the ideas of Adorno, was on his guard for projecting his own 
ideology on music as well. Quite the reverse, the objective material is subjectively grabbed 
and explored as in a children’s play, “in a so-called unbiased process of watchful observation, 
                                                          
48 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 165. 
49 Ibid., 201 and H. LACHENMANN and H.-K. METZGER, Fragen-Antworten, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. 
METZGER and R. RIEHN, München, 1988, 129. See also J. HIEKEL, Interkulturalität als existentielle Erfahrung. 
Asiatische Perspektiven in Helmut Lachenmanns Ästhetik, in Nachgedachte Musik. Studien zum Werk von 
Helmut Lachenmann, ed. J. HIEKEL and S. MAUSER, Saarbrücken, 2005, 76: “Here [e.g. in Ein Kinderspiel] a 
procession-like sentence type is realised, which is known in almost all periods of music history: a form of the 
ritual, the static, the ‘Abgesang’, that begins and ends in nothingness”.  
50 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 165. 
51 T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 147. 
52 Ibid., 178. 
53 Ibid., 125. 
54 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 165. 
55 R. WAGNER, as quoted by A. SEIDL, Vom Musikalisch-Erhabenen. Ein Beitrag zur Ästhetik der Tonkunst, 
Leipzig, 1907, 148-149. 
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trained by reason, intuition and curiosity”.56 As Lachenmann’s compositions thus ‘are aware’ 
of their artificial nature and sediment spirit (in the Adornian sense of the word), they are 
inevitably “broken” or dislocated, but they also “lose the sting of the lie of being a pure 
soulful sound, primarily and unconditionally”.57 The flaws in the composition then, allow for 
the development of a familiar present into something ‘new’, as a result of which compositions 
may, negatively speaking, point beyond… 
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56 H. LACHENMANN, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung. Schriften 1966-1995, Wiesbaden, 1996, 201 and H. 
LACHENMANN and H.-K. METZGER, Fragen-Antworten, in Musik-Konzepte 61/62, ed. H.-K. METZGER and R. 
RIEHN, München, 1988, 129. 
57 T. ADORNO, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, 170. 
